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THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW: 
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND (POSSIBLE) FUTURE 
Albert A. Foer and Robert H. Lande1  
October 20, 1999 
 
 As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and 
monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider 
the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative 
basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first 
nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may 
be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own 
competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an 
underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that it has also changed, often dramatically, 
from time to time and period to period, and is still in the process of change, reflecting 
changes in the political environment, our understanding of economics, and the 
perceived needs of the day. It is the combination of stability and flexibility that has kept 
antitrust relevant for more than a century, even as the nation has undergone 
remarkable changes. 
 
 I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 Before there was an antitrust statute in the United States, the common law as it 
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had developed in England and the United States recognized a positive value in 
competition, which was easy to find among the small businesses and small farms that 
dominated the scenery. Without putting a fine point on it, restraints of trade were 
considered illegal if they were unreasonable, but not otherwise, and it was up to judges 
to decide.4   
 With the coming of industrialization, the railroad, and the large corporation after 
the Civil War, a disrupted society began to worry about ‘‘trusts’’ which were rapidly 
moving to dominate a variety of important industries. The Sherman Act was passed in 
1890, named for a Republican Senator, John Sherman, and signed into law by a 
Republican President, Benjamin Harrison.  
 Highly controversial and rarely enforced for about one generation, the Sherman 
Act was subjected to changing interpretations, reflecting varying visions of the proper 
role of the corporation in an economy that now included both vigorously competitive 
markets and markets dominated by one or two extremely large corporations.5   Did the 
Sherman Act merely codify the old common law or was it intended to outlaw all 
restraints of trade? Could it be used to break up the trusts?  Two answers eventually 
became clear.  With the break up of Standard Oil of New Jersey in 1911, it was clear 
that the government could separate a monopoly into viable smaller parts.  But the 
Sherman Act would not reach all restraints of trade, but only those which a court holds 
to be unreasonable.6   
 By 1914, the desire had grown in many different sectors to define more clearly 
what restraints and what combinations would be predictably illegal. A burst of 
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Progressive legislation gave two responses. The Clayton Act outlawed mergers which 
may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, and also outlawed 
several specifically defined behavioral abuses such as certain tying arrangements, 
exclusive contracts, and price discrimination. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 
taking the opposite approach, made illegal the very unspecific ‘‘unfair methods of 
competition’’.  It created an administrative system capped by a panel of expert 
commissioners in place of the trial level judiciary. 
 The structure of antitrust was now established, and it has changed very little 
since 1914. At different times the laws have been amended, generally to clarify certain 
terms and to ‘‘perfect’’ the existing laws. Thus, merger law was made more 
enforcement-friendly;7 price discrimination was given more specific meaning;8 and 
companies desiring to merge were required to provide prior notice to the enforcement 
agencies and then wait for a period of time, before consummating.9 
 Along with the antitrust laws, we developed a marbled cake of other laws that 
directly or indirectly affect competition.  Most directly, laws established regulatory 
agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and 
the Federal Communications Commission. These had in common the authority to 
establish prices, terms of trade, and conditions of entry and exit for industries deemed 
‘‘natural monopolies’’ or otherwise too essential and potentially dangerous to be left to 
the unregulated marketplace. But the theory of regulation was based on the desire to 
achieve the fruits of competition: if something about the market made laissez faire 
unworkable, public representatives would be empowered to create industries that 
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performed for the public as if they were competitive. Such, at least, was the theory.  
 More indirectly, a host of laws that were intended to deal with issues other than 
competition inevitably played a role in the shaping of markets. For example, tax laws 
often had unequal effects on different industries or on differently positioned competitors 
within a given industry. Trade laws had a huge impact on the conditions of entry into an 
industry, protecting some from foreign competition and imposing a traumatic level of 
competition on others. Procurement and subsidy programs often gave competitive 
advantages to favored recipients.  In the 1960’s and 1970’s, a new crop of laws aimed 
at protecting consumers, the environment, and the workplace began to have their own 
indirect impact on competition in the markets they did (or did not) affect. 
 Finally, as the burdens of regulation became increasingly obvious, a 
deregulatory movement developed in the late 1970’s, peaking in the early 1980’s.  The 
objective became to replace regulation with free markets --or, where that was not 
feasible, to redirect it-----through greater reliance on market mechanisms.  
 
 II. THE INSTITUTIONS OF ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION POLICY 
 The legal structure established by 1914 was accompanied by an institutional 
structure that has also remained stable.  There are still two federal antitrust agencies, 
the FTC and the Antitrust Division.  Each has its distinct attributes. The Division has 
criminal enforcement power and thus specializes in dealing with price fixing and cartel 
behavior, where criminal penalties are sometimes imposed. Being part of the Executive 
Branch, the Division plays an active role in shaping an Administration’s competition 
policy. The Commission, which includes a Competition Bureau, a Consumer Protection 
Bureau, and an Economics Bureau working side-by-side, has at various times focused 
more on structural issues and their implications for consumers.  Formally an 




 In recent years, the Division and the Commission have had roughly equal 
budgetary resources, in the neighborhood of $100,000,000 each.  However, the 
Competition Mission of the Commission (the resources allocated to antitrust and 
competition policy) receives only about half of the total Commission resources.  Thus, it 
is accurate to generalize that the Division handles twice the antitrust load of the 
Commission, or two thirds of the total federal commitment. 
 Critics sometimes question why there are two separate antitrust agencies.  The 
answer is first, that this is an historical rather than a logical happenstance, and second, 
that the agencies are similar but not identical.  While they closely coordinate their 
investigations on the basis of expertise and available resources, a competitive factor 
exists between the agencies, which symbolically reflects the values they share, namely 
that two heads are often better than one. If we think of the agencies as two competing 
firms, a merger has not occurred because neither firm’s stockholders (the Executive 
Branch and the Congress) nor management is likely to benefit sufficiently. In the 
absence of an antitrust statute that would keep them from conspiring together, they 
have attained a level of coordination that probably minimizes any efficiency gain from a 
conceivable merger. 
 Both federal agencies regularly use their expertise to influence other 
governmental agencies. Their importance in this role has increased with the movement 
toward deregulation as formerly regulated monopolies are transformed into what are 
intended to be aggressive competitors. Such restructuring has created an expanded 
need for the kind of expertise developed by antitrust lawyers and economists through 
their enforcement of the antitrust laws. With roughly twice the resources of the 
Commission and a closer relationship with the President, the Division generally plays a 
more active role. To give an example, on matters relating to electricity, which is in the 
process of being partially deregulated, the Division advises the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission on the handling of public utility mergers.  The FTC, on the 
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other hand, has built a niche for advising the states on the competition and consumer 
protection aspects of electricity deregulation.10 
 One of the developments affecting antitrust in recent years has been the 
increased role of the states.11  As federal antitrust efforts declined in the 1980’s, many 
states expanded their antitrust role, particularly with regard to mergers and distributional 
restraints that were being ignored by the Reagan Administration. A recent manifestation 
is the current Microsoft case, which was filed jointly by the Antitrust Division and 
nineteen states.12 
 Competition policy is strongly influenced not only by the public antitrust agencies 
but also by private enforcement of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The private 
bar and economic consultants advise private firms on how to accomplish their business 
strategies within an environment of antitrust and competition policy.  In some cases, a 
strategy may be enhanced by threatening or bringing an antitrust case against a 
competitor, or by seeking out the assistance of a public antitrust agency.13  Recent 
examples apparently include Netscape, gaining assistance of the Antitrust Division 
against Microsoft, and American Express gaining the Division’s assistance against Visa 
and MasterCharge. 
 Generally, private attorneys tend to represent either plaintiffs or defendants, and 
they often find it difficult to cross the line. In addition to providing strategic advice to 
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clients, the defense bar represents clients once they have been targeted for 
investigation or litigation.  The plaintiffs’ antitrust bar is considerably smaller than the 
defense bar and often functions on a contingent fee basis rather than on an hourly 
retainer. Plaintiffs’ cases frequently ‘‘follow-on” government cases, sometimes in a class 
action format, attempting to recover for civil damages once the government has 
established a firm’s antitrust liability.  Since the early 1980’s, a variety of procedural and 
substantive changes in the practice of antitrust have made it more difficult for a private 
plaintiff to succeed. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ antitrust bar and with it the role of 
private enforcement has generally been reduced from the salad days of the 1970’s.14   
 Finally, competition policy is influenced by judges, usually federal judges and 
most importantly Supreme Court justices, as they sit in judgment of specific cases. 
Since the early 1980’s, the federal judiciary has become noticeably more conservative 
on antitrust matters. This reflects (a) the large number of judicial appointments by 
conservative Presidents, (b) a general intellectual trend led by ‘‘Chicago School’’ 
economists and lawyers, (c) an extraordinarily effective public relations effort to expose 
judges to Chicago School thinking, under the direction of conservative think tanks and 
institutes, and (d) the absence of an organized coalition dedicated to more expansive 
antitrust objectives.  
 As indicated, the direction and execution of antitrust is also affected by a 
community of scholars, think tanks, and legal and economic publications that constantly 
interacts with the antitrust process. 
 
 III. THE EVER-CHANGING ANTITRUST SCENE 
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 Despite the stability of the laws and institutions of antitrust for 85 years, ideas 
about the value and meaning of competition have been varied, with different ideas in 
ascendancy at different times. A review of the intellectual history of competition policy 
will help place the current period and near-term future in context.  
 One approach to the history of competition policy in America is to recognize 
fluctuations on a scale whose opposite ends are marked ‘‘competition’’ and 
‘‘cooperation’’.  Another is to observe fluctuations on a spectrum running from 
unfettered private ownership to public ownership. Still a third is to define the 
interrelations among a series of ‘‘regulatory regimes’’.  We will look briefly at each of 
these perspectives. 
 When the giant corporation suddenly appeared on the American scene in the 
1880’s, largely as the result of the basic communication and transportation 
infrastructure that was completed in the years after the Civil War, politicians and 
economists were faced with something new. How should the state deal with this 
powerful new institution? And those speaking for the big firm also had to create not only 
new methods of internal organization and management, but new methods of dealing 
with competitors. Small businesses and small farms had been competitive price takers. 
Big firms saw the potential for the first time of becoming price makers. 
 The big firms almost immediately took steps to consolidate their potential for 
controlling their markets. The first step was the development of cartels (trade 
associations) in the 1880’s. Next they moved toward legal consolidation, first in the form 
of the trust.  In the 1890’s, the holding company became a popular way to transform old 
cartels into more effective horizontal combinations. Then, at the turn of the century 
came our first great merger wave, one of the most important structural developments in 
our economic history.15   Meanwhile, companies were becoming administratively 
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centralized (something that was not happening concurrently in Europe) and finally they 
began to integrate vertically, forward and backward. From the big firm’s perspective, 
this was a time of shifting from a highly competitive framework to one in which 
coordination and cooperation should prevail. 
 Horizontal combinations gave big firms the ability to administer prices -- 
something they believed was essential for long-term planning and coordination of large-
scale national operations.  This probably meant higher prices, at least for some 
consumers, but it also may have permitted increases in efficiency. Vertical integration 
was perhaps more directly harmful to key economic players, such as the wholesalers 
who were powerful in every city and town. The changes spawned by the advent of the 
big firm naturally generated opposition, forcing the question of market structure into the 
political arena. 
 The earliest national reaction was the Sherman Act.16   As a compromise which 
nearly everyone seemed to favor, it necessarily contained a vagueness which covered 
over many important questions. Was the Sherman Act intended to maintain a highly 
competitive framework or was it intended to recognize the new dominance of big firms,  
simply placing constraints on the most anticompetitive situations? The ambiguous 
objectives had to be sorted out, first, by the Supreme Court. Its initial decisions limited 
the scope of the Sherman Act and treated it as a restatement of the common law, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the 1960’s conglomerate merger wave. The fourth wave came in the 1980’s; it reflected low stock prices, 
many foreign acquisitions, and an explosion of hostile tender offers. See F.M. Scherer and David Ross, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd Ed.)(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990) 153 
et. seq.; Kenneth M. Davidson, Megamergers (Cambridge:Ballinger Pub. Co., 1985) 129. The fifth wave 
began around 1994 and is not susceptible to easy generalization. Elements include strategic positioning 
for expanded international trade, restructuring around deregulation, and the shifting of strategy and 
structure in the face of rapid technological change.  A major motivation of the fifth wave, like the first, is to 
prevent price decreases that otherwise would result from new technologies. 
 
16   For overviews of the legislative history, see Robert H. Lande, ‘‘Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,’’ 34 Hastings L.J. 65 (1982); 
Andrew I. Gavil (ed.), An Antitrust Anthology (Anderson Publishing Co., 1996, part III;  Herbert 




basically saying that only unreasonable restraints of trade were illegal. With a change in 
the makeup of the Supreme Court, the opposite view prevailed: that the Sherman Act 
was not merely a restatement, but a new law for new times, and that all restraints of 
trade were now illegal. If this view held up, it would mean a return to the market 
competition model that existed before the big firms had appeared. Political battle lines 
were again forming over market structure issues. 
 Two Supreme Court decisions in 1911, the Standard Oil case and the American 
Tobacco trust case, split the difference: they held in favor of major divestiture remedies 
under the Sherman Act, while at the same time establishing that the rule of reason 
would predominate henceforth. This result, which was essentially satisfactory to the 
three leading presidential contenders, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, upheld the ability of 
big firms to restrain trade (i.e., develop cooperative activities) in reasonable ways, but 
not in ways that involved unfair methods of competition or that unreasonably excluded 
competitors from the market. Judges would fill in the blanks. 
 The election of 1912 nevertheless became the forum for a sophisticated debate 
over the role of the big corporation. Competition policy has never again achieved a 
comparable level of political salience. Roosevelt, the former president, argued in favor 
of a statist control over the corporation, recognizing the importance of large-firm 
efficiencies, but distrusting the ability of courts and whatever competition still existed to 
be an adequate protector of the public interest.  Taft, the incumbent, a judge by 
occupation, and a stronger trustbuster than Roosevelt had been, favored maintaining a 
rule of reason administered by the courts. Wilson, the Democrat in between, wanted a 
commission that would be able to define over time the line between fair and unfair 
competition. Wilson’s approach preferred a panel of relatively independent experts 
rather than a single judge to be the initial decision-maker once there were claims of 
wrongdoing, but like Taft and unlike Roosevelt, he would leave the private sector with 
the initiative for acting. It was Wilson’s vision that came closest to prevailing, with 
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passage of the FTC Act in 1914. 
 Actually, the antitrust laws were largely suspended only three years later, with 
the wartime mobilization. A new kind of bureaucratic structure arose that was part 
private and part public. The mobilization proved to be effective and after the war there 
were movements advocating amendments and reinterpretation of antitrust to help 
‘‘rationalize’’ the economy. A leader in this movement was the engineer and post-war 
food administrator, Commerce Department Secretary Herbert Hoover.  Hoover looked 
at the economy as a giant association, with the Secretary of Commerce at the top. As 
presidential candidate in 1928 and then as President, he espoused an associationalist 
perspective within the framework of an antitrust structure that he was constantly trying 
to stretch.17  This was in keeping with the popularity of associationalist schemes, both in 
Europe and in the U.S., during this period, schemes that included legalization of cartels.  
Indeed, the FTC at this time was busy adopting competition-restraining codes for each 
industry, until they were largely scrapped in 1930-31.  
 A renewed drive to end antitrust in the face of the Depression led to the National 
Recovery Act of 1933 under Franklin Roosevelt.  In effect, antitrust was suspended and 
industrial associations functioned as industrial governments. But associations were 
unable to solve a series of political problems and could not deliver on re-employment. 
The NRA couldn’t neutralize small business, local merchants, smaller farmers, and 
various groups committed to consumer interests.  There was no satisfactory role for 
organized labor and large companies became increasingly unhappy with the 
arrangement. The eventual response was the arrival of Thurman Arnold as head of the 
Antitrust Division in 1937 and the revival of antitrust.18 
                                                          







 The institutions of antitrust grew stronger, though hardly in a linear manner, from 
the Arnold revival through the late 1970’s. Meanwhile, a reformation movement was 
growing in the economics departments and law schools of several campuses, with the 
University of Chicago generally considered to be in the lead.19  By the time of the Carter 
Administration, conservative economists were playing a larger role in both the FTC and 
the Antitrust Division, the more aggressive manifestations of antitrust were under not 
only academic but political attack, and the country was becoming comfortable with the 
idea of deregulating such industries as air transportation, trucking, oil, and railroads.  A 
new consensus was forming in favor of competition, which would play an enlarged role 
even in industries where regulation would not be fully displaced. At the same time, a 
kind of libertarian, laissez faire attitude was rumbling in the background, with an 
underlying perspective that antitrust was itself just another form of regulation, in need of 
a serious haircut. 
 The election of President Reagan marked the triumph and the high water mark of 
the Chicago School in antitrust and competition policy. A conservative attorney, William 
Baxter, headed the Antitrust Division and a conservative economist, James Miller, 
headed the FTC. Economists played a far more important role within each bureaucracy, 
and the most influential economists were of the Chicago variety rather than the more 
traditional institutionalist school that had previously dominated industrial organization 
economics.20   The Reagan antitrust regime was characterized by an emphasis on the 
prosecution of horizontal price fixing schemes. Structural cases more or less 
disappeared, once the ATT divestiture settlement was approved. Vertical relationships 
became virtually unrestrained by antitrust. Predatory pricing was dismissed as 
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something that rarely happened and shouldn’t be prosecuted. Mergers became subject 
to a formal mode of economic analysis that was used with the effect of constraining 
merger enforcement.   All antitrust activity was directed towards one goal: improving the 
economic efficiency of the economy. 
 At the same time, free trade was promoted.  The pace of deregulation picked up.  
Government itself was under attack and many parts of the regulatory structure, 
including antitrust, suffered substantial resource cuts.  Privatization and contracting-out 
occurred in a variety of areas. Judicial appointments had to pass a litmus test of 
conservatism. All in all, the laissez faire end of the competition-cooperation spectrum 
predominated.  
 The Reagan Administration represented one end of the spectrum of state-market 
relations.The pendulum began gradually to swing back with the election of President 
Bush. Resources for antitrust slowly increased from their low points and the antitrust 
agencies became somewhat more aggressive with respect to anticompetitive behavior 
outside of price fixing.  Nevertheless, Chicago economists continued to occupy 
positions of influence and classical economics was now more or less entrenched, to 
one degree or another, in the thinking of all but the small populist wing of the antitrust 
community. 
 The Clinton Administration under Chairman Robert Pitofsky at the Federal Trade 
Commission and Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman and her successor Joel 
Klein at the Antitrust Division took a moderate but more expansive and activist view of 
antitrust.  Classical economics remained an influential mode of thought, but was 
increasingly conjoined with what was becoming known as a ‘‘post-Chicago” outlook.21  
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The post-Chicago outlook added an overlay of strategic thinking, nurtured in part in the 
nation’s business schools and management consulting firms, in an effort to enrich 
economic theory and to provide a sense of empiric realism that many critics found 
absent in the purist Chicago vision. The emerging vision recognized the importance of 
free markets, but saw that markets are neither automatic nor natural; rather, they are 
always embedded in social, political, economic, and legal institutions whose proximate 
reality must be taken into account.22  While post-Chicagoists continue to value efficiency 
and innovation extremely highly, they also care about protecting consumers from 
paying supracompetitive prices due to illegally acquired market power.23  
 To summarize, American history has a strong tradition of cooperative 
undertakings that run alongside our commitment to competition: the mercantilism of 
Alexander Hamilton, the War Industries Board, the NRA, even the FTC itself promoting 
associationalism. Particularly during times of crisis --depression or war-----cooperation, 
order, and national interest have been more important guiding symbols than 
competition.  
 What is perhaps extraordinary is the resiliency of antitrust. Antitrust is part of the 
larger picture of business-government relations and its role has repeatedly expanded or 
declined in accord with other features of the political landscape.  As much as it has 
been criticized over the years and as often as it has been suspended, undermined, and 
reinterpreted, it has always bounced back to a healthy norm. If it did not fulfil some 
substantial underlying needs of the American polity, the alternatives would surely have 
prevailed for longer periods. 
 Another extraordinary aspect of antitrust’s history is its bipartisan nature. In 
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recent years, it has seemed that antitrust was more of a Democratic than Republican 
interest.24 That view belies both the full history and the more recent history. The 
Republicans Sherman and Harrison started the federal antitrust mission. Republicans 
Roosevelt and Taft became the first important trustbusters. Wilson, the Democrat, 
added the Clayton and FTC Acts. The Republican Harding carried on the tradition. The 
Republican Hoover, for all of his associationalism, opposed price fixing and monopoly 
and opposed efforts to suspend the antitrust laws. The Democrat Roosevelt virtually 
suspended antitrust, only to revive it later in the New Deal. The Republican Eisenhower 
initiated numerous important antitrust cases and expanded the mandate to include bank 
mergers. It was the Republican Nixon who reinvigorated the FTC and initiated suits to 
stop the trend toward concentration.  
 Against this background, the Reagan Administration represents a major 
deviation from the course of antitrust history, but even though it shifted priorities and 
dramatically slashed many aspects of antitrust, the Reagan Administration remained 
faithful to narrowly defined core values of antitrust, particularly bolstering its price-fixing 
agenda, and, indeed,  brokered the landmark AT & T consent decree. The Bush 
Administration returned to a more traditional antitrust effort, which the Clinton 
Administration is carrying forward. Over the past century and in recent years, the 
antitrust mission has generally had a remarkable degree of bipartisan support.  
 
 IV. THE “REGULATORY REGIMES” OF ANTITRUST 
                                                          
24  John W. Kwoka, Jr., has found , in reviewing the period from 1970 to 1997, that federal antitrust 
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Presidential Address, forthcoming, Review of Industrial Organization. ‘‘Antitrust Enforcement at the 
Millenium,’’ Industrial Organization Society Presidential Address, forthcoming, Review of Industrial 
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 An additional perspective on the ever-changing relationship between the market 
and the government is provided by political scientist Marc Allen Eisner.25  Eisner defines 
a regulatory regime as "a historically specific configuration of policies and institutions 
which structures the relationship between social interests, the state, and economic 
actors in multiple sectors of the economy."26  In his conceptualization, each generation 
interprets regulatory policies and state-economy relations from its own historical 
position as part of a specific political-economic milieu. A new regime emerges "when 
new regulatory policies are initiated in several regulatory issue areas (e.g., finance, 
agriculture, and industrial relations) and are combined with significant institutional 
changes."27  He describes the history of regulation in the U.S. after 1880 in terms of four 
regimes, each of which was created in response to economic changes that threatened 
the perceived self-interest of various groups. 
 In Eisner's study, the emergence of a new regulatory regime does not 
necessarily entail the elimination of an earlier regime. Much remains the same, 
especially on the surface, as one regime shades into another, but the goals of 
regulation are continually changing, reflecting differences in the economic context, the 
demands for change, and the dominant conceptions in the political economy.28  
 The "market regime" emerged in the decades surrounding the year 1900 as the 
benchmark of the Progressive Era.  The creation of large corporations that swallowed 
up whole industries threatened the independence of many businesses and scared 
consumers.  In response to popular demands, elected officials developed antitrust to 
force a return to the market and in the case of electric power generation and the 
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railroads, legislation created administrative agencies to set rates roughly equal to what 
might have been set by market competition. 
 According to Eisner, a second wave of regulation followed the economy's 
collapse in the Great Depression. Although this new regime emerged during the New 
Deal, it was rooted in the associationalism of the 1920's, and so Eisner calls it the 
"associational regime."  This layering of public policy promoted a more activist state 
than Progressivism, desiring to manage and guide economic change "by means of 
structured interaction with economic associations."29   The National Industrial Recovery 
Act, which was central to the New Deal recovery effort, was an attempt to promote 
economic stability by means of an integrated regulatory framework governing 
production and pricing across multiple sectors of the economy. Many other initiatives 
used regulatory policies to redistribute national income toward certain regulated groups, 
with regulators giving economic associations a central role in defining and implementing 
regulatory policy. Antitrust was largely eclipsed during this period. 
 The third regulatory regime identified by Eisner is the "societal regime" which 
developed in the 1960's and 1970's. "The major initiatives of this period, rather than 
promoting economic stability or revitalizing markets, were designed to protect citizens 
from the health and environmental hazards that were an outgrowth of large-scale 
industrial production."30  Examples were the acts that empowered the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  Some 
scholars refer to this as "New Wave" regulation.31 
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31  ‘‘New Wave’’ regulation, relating to the protection of consumers, workers, and the environment, differ 
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competition or monopoly; (b) they are not industry-specific; and (c) they do not impinge directly on the 
price and output decisions of private firms. Peter Asch and Rosalind S. Seneca, Government and the 




 In part as a response to the increased amount of regulation apparent on the 
American scene, which was viewed as a cause of the nation's poor economic 
performance during the 1970's and 1980's, what Eisner calls the "efficiency regime" 
grew up.  Its feature was deregulation, market-oriented regulation, and the application 
of free-market economics to a wide variety of policy issues. 
 Our view is that we are now into a new regime, not yet named or defined. The 
new regime accepts a great deal of classical economics and considers efficiency and 
innovation to be crucial values.  But it is much more inclined than the Chicago School to 
observe market failures and to accept a governmental role in the correction of market 
failures. Rather than having faith that markets operate automatically and efficiently, it 
sees government as necessary to make and preserve markets.  It values markets not 
only for the efficiencies they can facilitate and for the innovation they can generate, but 
also with the range of choices they can offer to consumers and with insuring that 
consumers do not pay artificially high prices for goods and services.  The new regime is 
therefore multidimensional.  To distinguish this new regime from its predecessors, we 
call it ‘‘the consumer protection regime.’’32 
 
 V. CURRENT U.S. COMPETITION POLICY 
 In what ways has the environment of competition policy changed since the 
coming of the efficiency regime?  Seven factors seem most important. 
 First, we are in the midst of a merger wave of unprecedented size and scope, 
which is rapidly restructuring the American and the world economy.   Detailed 
information about merger trends is available in the annual report to Congress on the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,33 which documents the growth in number of transactions 
                                                          
32 See Lande, supra note 15; Robert H. Lande, ‘‘Consumer Choice as the Unifying Goal of Antitrust and 
Consumer Protection Law,’’ 14 Nihon University Comparative Law 131 (1997). 
 
33  The most recent is Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Annual Report to Congress, 
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reported: there were 2,883 in 1989, declining to 1,529 in 1991, then a period of rapid 
growth, hitting 2,305 in 1994, 2,816 in 1995, 3,087 in 1996, and 3,702 in 1997.  The 
number of transactions jumped to 4,728 in 1998.34  The New York Times reported on 
February 14, 1999, that ‘‘The frenzy over deals is likely to continue, particularly if 
American stock markets remain buoyant and European merger activity explodes, as 
Wall Street experts expect.’’35  
 The current merger wave is extraordinary not only for the number of 
transactions, but for the size.  Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein advised Congress 
in mid-1998, “[I]f you combined the value of all U.S. merger activity that took place in 
1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and early part of 1996, it would approximately 
equal the value of merger activity that can be expected in 1998 alone.’’36   It appears that 
the total value of U.S. mergers completed in 1998 exceeded $1.2 trillion37 -- in an 
economy with a gross domestic product of $8.4 trillion!  
 To quote the New York Times, ‘‘Since January, 1994, roughly the starting point 
of the decade’s boom in deal making, $7.1 trillion in deals have been announced 
worldwide. Of the 50 biggest American companies, measured by market value at the 
start of that year, six have disappeared through mergers --including Chrysler, Amoco 
and Nynex-----and three more will vanish if announced deals are completed. Those 50 
companies have been involved in 4,190 megers or acquisitions in the last five years, 
with a total value estimated at $1.4 trillion…’’38 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fiscal Year 1997 (20th Report), available at www.FTC.Gov . 
 
34  FTC, Mission Accomplishments (undated document provided by the Bureau of Competition, Jan. 26, 
1999). 
 
35 Laura M. Holson, ‘‘The Deal Still Rules,’’ New York Times, Feb. 14, 1999, Section 3. 
 
36 Statement of Joel I. Klein before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 16, 1998. 
 
37 Stephen Labaton, ‘‘Merger Wave Spurs a New Scrutiny,’’ New York Times, Dec. 13, 1998 at 38. 
 
38 Holson, op. cit. 
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 Second, we have advanced a long way in the deregulation movement. Where 
the focus had been on defining what is to be deregulated and how to deregulate, we 
now must focus on making deregulated markets function competitively and on applying 
the learning we have gained to industries, such as electricity, which are still in the 
process of deregulating.  
 Whether one believes that deregulation has been an unmitigated success, a 
mixed picture, or a disaster, there is an emerging consensus that antitrust must play a 
larger role than it has to date in assuring that deregulated markets are competitive. This 
consensus is driven by recognition that formerly regulated companies do not suddenly 
gain a competitive mentality; that bureaucracies which formerly regulated do not 
suddenly shift to an antitrust mindset; that merger waves can all too quickly concentrate 
deregulated industries, depriving the public of the competitiveness that was supposed 
to take the place of regulation; and that antitrust enforcement has not played a sufficient 
role either in preparing for deregulation or in keeping deregulated industries 
competitive.39 
 Third, we have moved into a more global marketplace. This does not imply, as 
some have argued, that antitrust is now irrelevant because increasing free trade makes 
markets adequately competitive. Rather, it makes antitrust more complicated and 
resource-intensive. International factors need to be taken into account in the 
investigation and analysis of antitrust allegations. With more nations committed to 
antitrust and competition policies,40 there is more need to coordinate with other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
39 See Albert A. Foer, ‘‘Institutional Contexts of Market Power in the Electricity Industry,’’ 12 The Electricity 
Journal 13 (May 1999), coining the term ‘‘Shermanization’’ for the institutional aspects of the transition 
from regulated monopoly to competition. Available at www.antitrustinstitute.org. 
 
40  Thirteen countries in the Western hemisphere currently have antitrust laws, with the majority of these 
laws enacted since 1990. Robert H. Lande, ‘‘Introduction to Symposium on Creating Competition Policy for 
Transition Economies, 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 339 (1997).‘‘ Since the late 1970’s, nearly 
forty transition economies have created new competition policy systems or retooled dormant antimonopoly 
laws.’’William E. Kovacic, ‘‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
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enforcement officials in terms of establishing and harmonizing policies and in terms of 
specific enforcement actions. 
 Fourth, we have become increasingly aware of networks, particularly in high tech 
industries. Microsoft and Intel are but two examples of companies which have been 
able to become globally dominant in a relatively short period of time by taking 
advantage of network effects and aggressively expanding into adjacent market space. 
Theories of efficient firm behavior have not proven satisfactory to justify the results.  
 Fifth, a ‘‘post-Chicago” reformation has questioned parts of the theory underlying 
the efficiency regime.41  This questioning has several components. One is derived from 
game theory and strategic behavior, utilized in the business schools and management 
consulting firms. This learning suggests that the strategic behavior of firms may 
frequently be different from the simplistic profit-seeking behavior postulated by classical 
economics. Another component is derived from dissatisfaction with the concept of 
efficiency, the meaning of which is not always clear (compare short-term efficiencies 
with long-term efficiencies; static efficiencies with dynamic efficiencies).  A third 
component is derived from a history of antitrust, which concludes that antitrust has from 
its earliest days had a multitude of goals, not just economic efficiency.42 
 Sixth, the political basis for antitrust has been shifting. With rare exceptions (e.g., 
in 1912-1914), antitrust has not had much political salience. To the extent that it had a 
constituency, it was primarily to be found in the small business and consumer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Economies,’’  23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 403 (1997). 
 
41 See John W. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White (Eds.), The Antitrust Revolution (3rd 
Ed.) (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 4: “[Post-Chicago economics] has gained 
acceptance as an intellectually rigorous alternative approach to antitrust. It represents a 
signficant counterweight to the views that have dominated the past twenty years, with 
fundamentally different policy implications and with increasing impact on antitrust 
enforcement and court decisions.” 
42  Robert H. Lande, ‘‘Beyond Chicago: Will Activist Antitrust Rise Again?’’ 39 Antitrust Bulletin 1 (1994); 




communities. Antitrust’s opposition came largely from big business and laissez faire 
economists. Today, the situation is changing. The large and long-lasting merger wave 
and the landmark Microsoft case have focused public attention on antitrust to a greater 
extent than any time since the ATT divestiture agreement.43  
 Consumer groups have intensified their interest, recognizing that consumers are 
injured when competition is not vigorous. Organized labor has become interested in 
antitrust as a response to the downsizing and destabilizing effects of the merger wave. 
Small businesses seek antitrust protection from mergers and vertical restraints which 
threaten their ability to compete on the merits (an example being the opposition of the 
independent booksellers to the acquisition of their largest wholesale distributor by their 
largest competitor).  Even relatively large companies have increasingly found it 
appropriate to support antitrust because of the strategic assistance it can give them in 
their fight to survive against a dominant rival. (Consider that the opponents of Microsoft 
have created the ‘Pro-Competition’ coalition;44 that American Express and Discover 
have assisted the Division in its investigation and suit against MasterCard and Visa; 
that Pepsi Cola has brought a private antitrust action against Coca Cola.)  State 
attorney generals, seeing a gap in enforcement and finding political benefit in pursuing 
antitrust cases, have responded to the political potential that is latent in antitrust. 
 Seventh, the federal antitrust budget has been changing.  Between 1970 and 
1997, the total budgets of the FTC and the Division grew from $102 million to $174 
million in constant (1992) dollars.  This represents a 70.6% overall increase and an 
annual rate of growth of 2%.45   But this growth masks the substantial ups and downs 
that have occurred. The peak budget occurred in 1977. This was followed by more than 
                                                          
43  See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 
44  Ths is described at the coalition’s home page, www.procompetition.org . 
 




a decade of decline, including the Reagan era of very dramatic cutbacks. A steady 
recovery began in 1990, but staffing levels have not yet caught up with where they were 
in 1980.  
 The two agencies have not been treated as twins. From 1970-1997, the Division 
budget grew by 151%, while the FTC’s budget grew by only 32%.46  For the last several 
years, the Division and the FTC have had roughly equal funding, but only half of the 
FTC’s funding has been allocated to antitrust.  Thus, it is accurate to say that roughly 
2/3’s of the federal antitrust mission is carried by the Justice Department. 
 The Antitrust Division in 1980 had a staff of 982. This declined to as low as 509 
in 1989. Since then, it has gradually climbed back to 846. The number of attorneys in 
the Division was 456 in 1980. It dipped to 229 in 1989 and was 363 in 1998. One might 
have expected that the drop in attorneys would be offset by a growth in the number of 
economists, in that the influence of economists and economic analysis was increasing 
during this period. The number of economists was 47 in 1980; it had only grown to 54 in 
1998. The occupational category that has grown is that of paralegal, which increased 
(as a matter of choice by the Division) from 53 in 1989 to 185 in 1998. 
 The FTC’s staff included 1719 Full-Time Equivalents in FY 1980. This was cut 
precipitously to a low of 894 in F.Y. 1989.  It grew slowly upward to 979 in F.Y. 1997.47 
Information on the Maintaining Competition Mission was obtained for the years 1990 
through 1998 (estimate).48  The actual obligations budget grew from $34.4 million in F.Y. 
1990 to $55.6 million (56%, unadjusted for inflation) and the number of Full-Time 
Equivalents grew from 441 in 1990 to 458 in 1998 (4%). 
 For Fiscal Year 1999, Congress increased the Antitrust Division’s budget by 
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5.1%, to $98,275,000 (an increase of 8 workyears) and increased the FTC’s overall 
budget by almost 10%, to $116,700,000. Much of the FTC’s increase was directed, 
however, to internet fraud and a consumer response center, rather than to antitrust. 
 The federal antitrust mission is a government function that more than pays for 
itself. The premerger notification program includes filing fees of $45,000 paid by each of 
the merging parties. These fees now supply almost 100% of the two agencies’ 1999 
budgets (including the FTC’s consumer protection budget).  The FY 2000 President’s 
Budget takes no money from the General Fund, relying entirely on premerger filing 
fees.  
 By law, fees collected by the agencies in conjunction with the receipt of 
premerger notifications filed under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act are for the exclusive use 
of the two antitrust enforcement agencies.49 Thus, no program or priority other than 
antitrust enforcement has any expectation of receiving these funds, and-----to the extent 
that filing fees are sufficient-- Congress need not take anything away from anyone else 
to fund antitrust.  
 In addition to the filing fees, the Justice Department obtains criminal fines in 
antitrust cases, against both individuals and corporations.  The average annual total for 
1997, 1998, and 1999 (estimated) is $118 million, i.e., $10 million more than the 
Division’s budget. In 1999, the estimates proved grossly inadequate, as the Justice 
Department obtained record-setting fines in several international cartels. In fact, by the 
third quarter, fines had exceeded $1 billion. These fines go into a special fund for 
                                                          
49 See Pub. L. No. 101-162, sec. 605, 103 Stat. 1031 (1989), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-302, Title II, 
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Justice, ‘Salaries and Expenses, Antitrust Division’…Provided further,  That fees made available to the 
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compensating victims of crime. 
 Finally, any consideration of the costs revenue sources of antitrust ought also to 
mention the savings to the American public which accrue from successful antitrust 
actions. There is, in general, relatively little data on this, although there is much theory 
as to the reasons we think there are large benefits. Based on detailed econometric 
work done by the FTC after it stopped the merger of Office Depot and Staples in 1977, 
a single case can save consumers as much as the combined cost of the FTC and 
Antitrust Division --for five years!50 
 
 VI. WILL ANTITRUST HAVE A POST-CHICAGO FUTURE? 
 The previous Section shows that, after a generation of decline, antitrust appears 
to be making a comeback.  But who will actually push an activist agenda for antitrust? 
 The antitrust constituency used to be led by small business, but rarely is that the 
case now. Today’s ‘‘entrepreneur,’’ taught in business school to focus even from start-
up on an exit strategy, seemingly can’t wait to be bought out by someone larger. This 
mentality is not likely to make antitrust a high priority.  
 By contrast, in many instances large second-tier companies seek antitrust help in 
their fight against a dominant player. Pepsi brings a civil antitrust suit against Coke. 
Netscape feeds information to Joel Klein.  Such companies--along with companies that 
want to participate on a level playing field in deregulated markets-----have the potential of 
becoming advocates of the institutions of antitrust. 
 Interestingly, organized labor, which historically has not been particularly 
supportive of antitrust, has become increasingly concerned about mergers. After all, it is 
often union employees who are downsized out of the merged company and there are 
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fewer companies left to bid for an employee’s specialized skills.  
 The antitrust plaintiffs’ bar has the potential to supplement federal and state 
antitrust resources by taking on the role of private attorneys general. Their interests and 
those of consumers usually coincide. But this sector of the bar is much less organized 
than the defendants’ bar and tends to be comprised of mavericks and individualists who 
are less likely, by nature, to join forces. All too often their reaction to the decline of 
antitrust has been to flee to other fields of law, such as securities litigation. 
 Many in the defense bar are allied with conservative foundations and the leaders 
of big business who have a stake in cutting antitrust. back. Their institutions have 
dominated Washington for a quarter of the century.  Three of the largest --The 
American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute-----each 
reportedly spends close to $30 million per year, much of it on competition-related 
issues.  They have helped cause the substantial reductions in federal antitrust 
resources since the 1970’s. 
 Consumer groups are today the primary political supporters of antitrust. They 
recognize that free markets work best for consumers when there is active antitrust 
enforcement to ensure the market is free to offer consumers the choices they desire. 
Even those consumer advocates who would in their hearts prefer regulation understand 
that this will not happen, and so they adopt antitrust as a second-best solution.  
 Despite fact that one side is well organized and well funded and the other side is 
neither, recent years have seen real signs of antitrust life at the Justice Department, the 
FTC, and in many States.  But, the advocates of constricted antitrust make their political 
donations and otherwise promote their views. How long will it be before the Joel Kleins 
and Bob Pitofskys are replaced by faceless, comparatively passive enforcers-----or even 
worse, by Chicago School ideologues? How can supporters of vigorous antitrust  take 
advantage of the current antitrust moment? Three things are required.  
 First, the forces which have a current or latent interest in robust antitrust must 
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effectively coalesce.  
 Second, the public must be educated as to antitrust’s value. For example, how 
many are aware that when the FTC blocked the proposed merger between Staples and 
Office Depot, the annual savings for consumers was approximately equal to the annual 
federal budget for antitrust?  
 And third, politicians at the federal and state levels must be convinced that 
vigorous antitrust is a bipartisan, mainstream capitalist issue, and therefore they should 
significantly increase the public resources devoted to protecting competition.  
 The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) was created earlier this year to help 
coalesce, focus, and energize these forces.51  A small, independent non-profit 
organization whose mission is to develop a centrist/left coalition of supporters of 
antitrust, the AAI draws on the brainpower of a growing board of advisors. This already 
includes Alfred Kahn, the father of deregulation; Howard Metzenbaum, the former chair 
of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee and current chair of the Consumers Federation of 
America; several entrepreneurs; and a variety of antitrust law professors, private 
practitioners, and economists. All are committed to a post-Chicago reconstruction of 
antitrust. 
 Early initiatives of the AAI have involved the airline and energy industries.  When 
the Department of Transportation proposed rules for dealing with predation at hub 
terminals, AAI endorsed the effort, providing an explanation for why predation is an 
appropriate subject for antitrust-type scrutiny(in the face of the Chicago school’s 
bewildering success in labelling  price predation as a virtual impossibility). The AAI 
offered a creative ‘‘safe harbor’’ alternative which would permit dominant airlines to cut 
prices as low as they want, provided the low prices are guaranteed to stay in effect for a 
substantial period of time.  
                                                          




 When the Federal Energy Regulation Commission asked for comments on its 
proposed merger guidelines, AAI responded by calling for a moratorium on utility 
mergers until the infrastructure could be built for assuring competition in a deregulated 
electricity market. In view of what has been learned about the deregulation process in 
other industries, the AAI said, FERC will have to reinvent itself for antitrust 
responsibilities. 
 The AAI has also gone to bat for increased resources for the federal antitrust 
agencies. It recently provided an analytical memorandum to the Congressional 
Conference Committee working on the DOJ and FTC budgets. As part of its education 
mission, the AAI on October 30 conducted its first antitrust briefing for business and 
legal journalists, with Advisory Board members William Kovacic (George Washington 
University Law School) and Stephen Calkins (Wayne State University Law School) 
joining the two co-authors of this Article in a panel presentation on antitrust stories to 
follow over the next six months.  
  Among the projects the AAI is currently working on are: (1) continued 
participation in air transportation and electricity restructuring issues (2) proposals to 
strengthen the federal merger guidelines; (3) model state indirect purchaser legislation; 
(4) an analytic framework that will help identify non-traditional yet anti-consumer 
collusive activity, (5) a research agenda for antitrust academics, and (6) development of 
a position paper on federal antitrust resources in fiscal year 2000.  
 Antitrust, a lynch pin of competitive capitalism, rests on a solid, bipartisan 
tradition.  ther than being outmoded by the development of new technologies, antitrust 
has become ever more relevant. Today we are participating in a post-Chicago 






 We have painted a portrait of antitrust and competition policy in the United 
States, from the common law era, through the Sherman Act of 1890, to the present. We 
have shown that antitrust has rested on a remarkable degree of bipartisan political 
support.  When the nation has been in crisis of war or unprecedented economic 
depression, it has sometimes backed off from antitrust, experimenting with alternative 
models of state-business relations. But the United States always came back to reliance 
on antitrust. Nonetheless, the content of antitrust has not remained static.  
 Among the factors responsible for the dynamics of competition policy have been: 
general attitudes toward the relationship between the state and markets; shifting 
coalitions behind or against various antitrust policies; changing economic environment 
and structural changes in the economy; developments in economic knowledge and 
theory; the personal impact of various political leaders; and occupational sociology 
within the enforcement agencies as lawyers and economists (of various schools) jockey 
for influence.  As nations develop their own institutions for competition policy, they 
might well find in the rich historical experience of the United States a number of useful 
hints that can be assimilated into their planning. 
  
 
30 
 
